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Introduction
The arguments in favor of closer military cooperation among
NATO's European members are much the same at the start of the
Al 1 lance's fourth decade as they were in its first:

that some form

of European defense entity would represent an increase in Europe's
share of the burden, and thus encourage a consolidated U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe; that a more self~sufficient European
defense capacity would be a deterrent to Soviet threats or pressure
if the credibility of this U.S. guarantee in fact were to decline;
that greater integration of European defense efforts would reduce
the waste entailed by separate and often competing national systems
of equipment procurement; and that the process of integrating the
highly sensitive sector of defense and security policies would
promote the closer political union of the states which participated.
The arguments advanced against a European defense entity, 1 ikewise, are similar a quarter-century after the demise of the· European
Defense Community (EDC) to those that were current at the time: that
-greater Eueopean self-sufficiency might weaken the American commitment,

rather than strengthening it; that the Europeans, despite all

their ec.onomic resources, could never assemble a military deterrent
strong enough to rep 1 ace the American guarantee;

that

11

it is not

possibl~ to forsee at present a move towards a common d~fense pol icy
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of the Nine or circumstances •.• which would make such a move either
necessary or desirable''; that ''rationalization of defense procurement and strengthening of conventional defense are being,pursued
energetically in NATO with the U.S. participation which is so
essential"; and that, far from promoting political unity, a common
defens.e policy would compromise

it, since "the Nine are at a very

early stage in the process of evolving a common foreign polity and
it is essential to concentrate on constructive elements which lead
towards a progressive alignment of policies and to avoid elements
which would be destructive. 111
There is thus a somewhat enervating sense of dlj~ vu about the
arguments in presence: Harold Macmillan recalls in his memoirs that
when the Council of Europe was- being set up in May 1949

11

the British

government tried to rule out defense from the scope of the new body
(as being dealt with by NATO.).112
However,

it is cl ear that there wi 11 be some new factors at

work, as Europe and NATO move fr;m the 197O 1 s to the 198O 1 s, which
wi 1 J modify the shape of the fami 1 iar problem, and add urgency to
the attempt to solve it.

Among these new factors, which wil 1 be

considered in the succeeding sections of this paper, are the
following: -The mounting scarcity of resources for spending on conventional defense, which strengthens the case for greater coordination of European procurement efforts as a contribution to a genuine
11

two-way street" in NATOj

-The perceptible if unsteady advances towards European political
unification

marked by the direct election of the parliament, the

establishment of the EMS, and the progress of European Political
Cooperation;
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-And the evident need,

in the 1 ight of "gray area 11 problems revealed

in the SALT 1 I negotiations, for the European members of NATO to
clarify their common strategic interests and to promote them collectively, whether negotiations for SALT I I I agreement take' place or not.
The economics of conventional weapons procurement.
Although the European members of NATO have responded without too
much difficulty to the· recently agreed program for an increase of 3%
in defense spending,

it is clear that by the mid-1980 1 s the cost of

producing up~to-date conventional weapons on a convincing scale,
along the nationally-organized p~ocurement methods in use today,
will be prohibitively high.

The European Parl iament 1 s Committee on

Economic and Monetary Affairs,

in its comments on the industrial

aspects of the Parl iament 1 s 1978 report on arms procurement,
emphasized the reasons why in the age of high techno 1 ogy

11

of defense equipment has increased far more than general

rates of

the cost

inflation••, and continued:
The combination of less resources for military research and
development in the European aircraft industry (than in the
USA) and the diipersal of these resources between a far
larger number of ,companies has undoubtedly had an extremely
adverse effect on the competitiveness of the military and
civil sector. 3
The prospective worsening of this situation, with its negative
con s e q u e n c e s n o t o n 1 y f o r t h e mi 1 i t a r y ca p a b i 1 i t y o f NATO I s Eu r o p e a n
members, but also for their competitive capacity in high technology
industry in general, should certainly focus the attention of governments on the possibilities of greater efficiency through a rationalization of procurement procedures.

The urgency of the problem will

be enhanced by the continuing rise in the cost of energy,
and by the consequent pressure on European
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governments to re-allocate energy supplies away from sectors of
industrial production characterized by wasteful duplication of
effort (both in R & D ftnd in production) such as the arms procurement industry.
Earlier studies of the means towards more efficient procedures
f or European arms procurement

4 have recently been . supplemented by

two detailed analyses which make concrete suggestions on ways to
go forward.

One of these studies, the report prepared for the

Political Committee of the European Parl lament by its rapporteur
Dr. Egon Klepsch, makes detailed proposals for an amplification
of the European Community's industrial pol icy to embrace the
militarily and economically vital sector of weapons procurement. 5
The other report, by a study group sponsored by the. Federal
Trust for Education and Research in Lon~on, ranges more broadly
in its recommendations, which include the establishment of a
European Defense Institute, and intensified consultations on
strategic doctrine concerning nuclear weapons. 6
Both reports suggest, as their central recommendation in
the field of weapons procurement, an active involvement of the
E1;1ropean Community, through its industrial pol icy, and preferably
through a development of the existing Independent European Programme Group in the alliance.
These arg~ments - which receive indirect but powerful
endorsement from~ recent study of the existing 1 imitations and
failings of Community policy in the aerospace sector 7
will not be repeated at length in the present paper.

It is

enough to state here that the balance of the arguments, which
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has so far told against any systematic attempt to promote weapons
procurement at the European level, now appears certain to shift,
in part for the economic reasons outlined above,

in the opposite

direction.

The context of European politics·.
The effect of these economic factors will
current and

impending developments

European Community,

be reinforced by

in the politics of the

including the election of

its Parliament

by direct suffrage, the move towards monetary i~tegration, and
the strengthening of the system of European Political

Cooperation.

The increased authority given to the European Parliament by
the direct elections of 1979 will allow it to
great er

i n f 1 u e n c e on

intervene with

i s s u e s wh e r e ev e n t h e p r e v i o u s P a r 1 i amen t

expressed quite specific views, among them the issue of European
defense cooperation.

In June 1978 the old Parliament gave

emphatic endorsement to the Klepsch report, and called for
11

a European action program

of conventional

for the development and production

armaments within.the framework of the common

·i n dust r i a 1 po 1 i c y.

118

The new Parliament will

certainly press the Commission

very hard for an effective response ~o this demand.
reason for this

is that defense policy, especially where it

1 inked with critical
will

The main

issues of

is

industrial and economic pol icy,

provide an obvious sector of activity for mem~ers of the

European Parl ianient concerned to extend the Parl iament 1 s
f 1 u en ce i n to a re a s of

11

h i g h po 1 i t i cs . I_!

It

in-

is also relavent to

note that several members of the new Parliament have an active
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interest in military affairs: one of them, the British Conservative
Derek Prag, was the author of a proposal for a European defense
force entailing a high degree of integration. 9

It should also

be noted that the author of the Klepsch Report has himself been
elected to the new Parliament, and re-elected as Chairman of its
influential Christian Democratic Group.
Brief mention should also be made of the establishment of
the European Monetary System early in 1978.

This important step

towards financial and economic int~gration (in which Britain
under its Conservative administration is· likely to join) will
have the effect of strengthening the economic ahd political
solidarity between the EC's members, and laying foundation on
which cooperation in military and security matters can be
developed.
One element in this development i~ the syste~ of
European Political Cooperation which has grown from the
Davignon Report of 1970, and which provides for permanent consultation and co-ordination between the foreign ministries of
the Nine.

There have been, and still are, several obstacles in

the way of extending this diplomatic cooperation to the military
field:

these include France's non-participation in the NATO

command structure, and Ireland's non-membership of the alliance,
as well as substantive differences in military ·policy among
member-states.

However, the EPC system has been used by the

Nine to coordinate their policies on certain areas of international
security problems - in, for instance, the CStE and in the UN's
discussions on disarmament - and it is extremely 1 ikely that in
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the fairly near future this practice will be extended.
The new British Conservative administration has a much
more positive view of European defense cooperation than its
.
labor predecessor - there is support for the plan that the
Nine 1 s defense ministers and their officials should meet on the
same regular basis as the Foreign Ministers - and such moves are
1 ikely to receive strong German support, whether Herr Schmidt or
Herr Strauss is elected Chancellor in 1980.

The Global Strategic Context: Europe and· SALT I I I
The current and impending evolution of the SALT dialogue
between the USA and the Soviet Union provides a further incentive
for NAT0 1 s European members to coordinate th~ir policies in
defense matters, and such a development appears 1 ikely, though
by no means automatic. lO
In 1978-79 the discussion of SALT I I has changed from being
a US-Soviet negotiation to one between the executive and legislative
branches of the U.S. government; West European concerns about
some of SALT I I 1 s implications for European Security have been
much less forcefully expressed than they were in 1977-78,

The

governments of America 1 s European allies want the SALT I I treaty
to be ratified, but their current relative silence will give way,
when and if ratification is achieved, to the expression of distinctive European concerns on a wide range of issues some of which have
been present since the days of SALT I.
The specific form and manner of all this wil 1 depend partly
on how soon a SALT I I I negotiation is undertaken -

if indeed it
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is.

There is also, as just indicated, no guarantee that European

governments wi 11 think or speak in agreement on these issues.
However the 1 ikelihood is that in the global strategic and political
environment of the early 1980 1 s, West Europearis will be forced to
think together on the following issues, among others:
Firstly, how does the probable vulnerability of the American
ICBM force affect the security of Europe, arid what measures (including possible SALT I I I negotiations and also the stationing
, of more U.S. missiles in Europe) would ~uropeans 1 ike to see the
U.S. take in consequence?
Secondly, what measures would European governments wiih
NATO to undertake in order to maintain the strategic balance
in the European theatre?
SS20 missile and the

11

Should the Western response to ~he

backfire 11 bomber be a determined attempt
r

to limit their deployment, and if so, what Western systems
should be I imited in exchange?
Thirdly (a critical

issue in any consideration of a more

coordinated West European defense effort), what steps should be
ta·ken to maintain the

11

seamless webb 11 1 inking NAT0 1 s conventional
~

f o r c e s w i· t h t h e U• S • s t r a t e g i c d e t e r r en t , a n d t o p r e v en t

11

d e co u p 1 i n g 11

at any point in that web?
Fourthly (a question essentially for the British and French
governments), will the renewal and maintenance· of their two
"independent" nuclear forces take a more

11

European 11 form, even

though this raises the difficult question of the FRG 1 s association with the project?
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Fifthly, will any extension of the non-transfer provisions of .SALT I I make it difficult for the USA in the
future to continue support for the airborne components of the
British and/or French deterrents,

and what problems might arise

from the inclusion of MIRVed air-launch~d cruise missiles, transferred to European control,

in the total permitted to the USA?

Sixthly, how should the European members of NATO be represented,
if at all,
interests?

in a SALT I I I negotiation whlch will vitally affect their
Should European observers be_ included in the actual

negotiations, or should Western positions be coordinated outside
these, perhaps through delegation of authority to some special
NATO representative or representatives?
This section of the paper has deliberately posed questions
rather than suggesting answers: the questions, however, are ones
to which Europeans will be under increasing pressure to find
collective solutions.

ConclusionThe attempt to promote greater West European cooperation in defense, as indicated at the start of this paper,
has a long and unimpressive history.

However, the combination

of pressures outlined here suggests that if cooperation is pursued
in the rfght ways - through work on the procurement of equipment
and through consultations on doctrine, rather than through any
premature attempt at the establishment of integrated European
defense forces - the next phase of the story may be more successful.
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